

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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Action
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FROM: Taipei

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 795, December 13, 1950

Bureau of
Far Eastern Affairs
DEC 14 1950
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Department of StateControl: 6442
Back: 11:18

Action Assigned to CA

Action Taken

Noted

Date of 12-14-50

Action CA

Name of Officer

Direction to DCR

EYES ONLY RUSK FROM RANKIN.

REVIEWED BY

DATE

Reaction here to Truman-Attlee meeting reserved by generally favorable press telegrams 782 and 783. US would advocate vague hope of buying firm and fact US Chinese Communist recognition and UNO seat is regarded as net gain. However, judgment on future prospects will be reserved in Chinese Government circles and among public here until clearer picture available of intended course US action.

Local opinion fails see how further consideration by UNO of Formosan issues can contribute to peaceful settlement and maintenance of security in Pacific unless supplemented by effective and continuing measures to counter Communist aggression. Without such measures, in face unyielding Communist position and avowed intention take Formosa by force further UNO discussion at best would bring no substantial result and at worst produce appealing compromise opening way for Communists to gain control of island.

There is general appreciation in Chinese Government circles of soundness US policy in continuing maximum use UNO channels, in welcoming discussion of any topic and in avoiding use of veto every possible way. However, no one expects UNO as such to produce and implement practical program of safeguarding "interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific" except as such program is put forward and supported by US. As Prime Minister Cheng said to me last Sunday, "very existence of free world depends upon unity of free nations, which in turn depends upon American leadership. We are all looking for that leadership and stand ready to follow it." By "all" he meant all free nations.

In actual fact US is already embarked on positive course of action re Formosa and it seems probable this and that Truman-Attlee agreement will be carried through

to logical

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to logical conclusion. This could be done without fanfare and without doing violence to our UNO and other commitments. It is question of stepping up and clarifying action already underway:

1. While welcoming UNO or other international discussion of "future of Formosa" I believe we should use every appropriate occasion to reiterate and make clear our position that whatever may be said and done we shall resist ulumf* force to change island's status and that its legal position can be settled only by Japanese treaty. These two points are not new but their significance has been beclouded by mention of various less specific alternatives and qualifications involving "international action" et cetera. (Chinese Government now inquires whether US request November 15 to postpone GA discussion of Formosa indicates we will not take initiative in reviving question island's future status during current session).

2. ECA Formosa program calling for increased aid and assignment of modest number US technical experts should be accelerated in every possible way to produce maximum results at earliest date. This is already in process and most logical and satisfactory aspect of US effort here.

3. Present Defense Attache Staff of 50 Americans should be expanded to permit detail of qualified officers and enlisted men to various Chinese Army, Navy and Air units where they would advise on training and use of equipment besides keeping US Government informed on Chinese military effectiveness, on their equipment and other needs and on end-use of American aid. This would represent simply expansion of what already being done and need not be heralded as "despatch of US Military Mission". Personnel could be sent as available to meet specific needs signaled by senior Military Attache and would be subject his orders; they probably never would exceed 200. Such action much preferable to setting up formal "mission" with inevitable but unwanted overhead and political implications here and in US.

With foregoing political, economic and military steps we should be well on way to making Formosa capable of resisting aggression, economically self-supporting and, in event hostilities spread, a military asset. Equipping and training forces here should be for defensive purposes; this leaves plenty to be done while avoiding encouragement of independent adventures (MYTEL 674, November 20). However, when equipped and trained for defense of this island Nationalist Forces could readily fit into possible combined offensive operations in event of general conflict. In this respect we should look ahead as

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far as Chinese Communists who apparently expected quick North Korean victory last summer but nevertheless planned long in advance for use of their own troops if needed.

Above shown to Moyer and Jarrett who concur.

RAIKIN

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*As received.

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